The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1992/92_1123/92_1123.zpc

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-1123
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IZUMI SEIMITSU KOGYO KABUSHIKI KAISHA,
PETITIONER v. U. S. PHILIPS
CORPORATION et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the federal circuit
[November 30, 1993]

  Per Curiam.
  In order to reach the merits of this case, we would
have to address a question that was neither presented
in the petition for certiorari nor fairly included in the
one question that was presented.  Because we will
consider questions not raised in the petition only in the
most exceptional cases, and because we conclude this is
not such a case, we dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted.
  Petitioner was named as a defendant, along with
respondent Windmere Corporation, in an action brought
by respondent U. S. Philips Corporation in the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida claiming that
the defendants had infringed Philips' patent rights and
engaged in unfair trade competition.  Windmere counter-
claimed for antitrust violations.  At the first trial of the
action, judgment was entered on a jury verdict for
Philips on its patent infringement claim, and neither
Izumi nor Windmere appealed.  Philips also prevailed on
Windmere's antitrust counterclaim, and the District
Court ordered a new trial on the unfair competition
claim.  On Windmere's interlocutory appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed
the judgment on the antitrust counterclaim and re-
manded the case for a new trial.  U. S. Philips Corp. v.
Windmere Corp., 861 F. 2d 695 (CA Fed. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U. S. 1068 (1989).  Izumi took no further
part in the litigation.
  A second jury found in favor of Windmere both on
Philips' unfair competition claim and on Windmere's
antitrust counterclaim, and judgment was entered in
favor of Windmere on the latter for more than $89
million.  Philips appealed both judgments to the Federal
Circuit.  Before the Court of Appeals decided the case,
however, Windmere and Philips reached a settlement
wherein Philips agreed to pay Windmere $57 million.
Windmere and Philips also agreed jointly to request the
Court of Appeals to vacate the District Court's judg-
ments, although the settlement was not conditioned on
the Federal Circuit granting the vacatur motion.  After
Windmere and Philips filed their joint motion to vacate,
petitioner sought to intervene on appeal for purposes of
opposing vacatur.
  The Court of Appeals denied Izumi's motion to
intervene.  U. S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971
F. 2d 728, 730-731 (CA Fed. 1992).  It reasoned that
Izumi was not a party to the second trial, and that its
financial support of Windmere's litigation as an indemni-
tor was not sufficient to confer party status.  The Court
of Appeals also concluded that Izumi's interest in
preserving the judgment for collateral estoppel purposes
was insufficient to provide standing.  Ibid.  The Court
of Appeals proceeded to review the vacatur motion and
concluded that, because the settlement included all the
parties to the appeal, vacatur was appropriate.  Id., at
731.
  Title 28 U. S. C. 1254(1) provides, in relevant part:
     -Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed
by the Supreme Court . . .
     -(1) [B]y writ of certiorari granted upon the
petition of any party to any civil or criminal case,
before or after rendition of judgment or decree.-
(Emphasis added).
Because the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion
for intervention, Izumi is not a party to this particular
civil case.  One who has been denied the right to
intervene in a case in a court of appeals may petition
for certiorari to review that ruling, Auto Workers v.
Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 208-209 (1965), but Izumi
presented no such question in its petition for certiorari.
It presented a single question for our review: -Should
the United States Courts of Appeals routinely vacate
district court final judgments at the parties' request
when cases are settled while on appeal?-  Because this
question has divided the Courts of Appeals, we granted
certiorari.  507 U. S. ___ (1993).  In its brief on the
merits, petitioner added the following to its list of
questions presented:  -Whether the court of appeals
should have permitted Petitioner to oppose Respondents'
motion to vacate the district court judgment.-
  This Court's Rule 14.1(a) provides, in relevant part:
-The statement of any question presented [in a petition
for certiorari] will be deemed to comprise every subsid-
iary question fairly included therein.  Only the questions
set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will
be considered by the Court.-  Unless we can conclude
that the question of the denial of petitioner's motion to
intervene in the Court of Appeals was -fairly included-
in the question relating to the vacatur of final judg-
ments at the party's request, Rule 14.1 would prevent us
from reaching it.
  It seems clear that a challenge to the Federal Circuit's
denial of petitioner's motion to intervene is not -subsid-
iary- to the question on which we granted certiorari.
On the contrary, it is akin to a question regarding a
party's standing, which we have described as a -thresh-
old inquiry- that -`in no way depends on the merits'- of
the case.  Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155
(1990) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500
(1975)).
  We also believe that the question is not -fairly
included- in the question presented for our review.  A
question which is merely -complementary- or -related-
to the question presented in the petition for certiorari is
not -fairly included therein.-  Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U. S. ___ (1992).  Thus, in Yee, we concluded that
the question whether an ordinance effected a physical
taking did not include the related question of whether
it effected a regulatory taking.  Ibid.  Whether petitioner
should have been granted leave to intervene below is
quite distinct, both analytically and factually, from the
question of whether the Court of Appeals should vacate
judgments where the parties have so stipulated.  The
questions are even less related or complementary to one
another than were the questions in Yee.
  The intervention question being neither presented as
a question in the petition for certiorari nor fairly
included therein, -Rule 14.1(a) creates a heavy presump-
tion against our consideration- of that issue.  Id., at ___.
Rule 14.1(a), of course, is prudential; it -does not limit
our power to decide important questions not raised by
the parties.-  Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U. S. 313, 320, n. 6
(1971).  A prudential rule, however, is more than a
precatory admonition.  As we have stated on numerous
occasions, we will disregard Rule 14.1(a) and consider
issues not raised in the petition -`only in the most
exceptional cases.'-  Yee, supra, at ___ (quoting Stone v.
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976)); see also
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 443, n. 38 (1984)
(-Absent unusual circumstances, . . . we are charyof considering issues not presented in petitions for
certiorari-).
  We have made exceptions to Rule 14.1(a) in cases
where we have overruled one of our prior decisions even
though neither party requested it.  See, e.g., Blonder-
Tongue, supra, at 319-321.  We have also decided a case
on nonconstitutional grounds even though the petition
for certiorari presented only a constitutional question.
See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, 457 (1960);
Neese v. Southern R. Co., 350 U. S. 77, 78 (1955).  We
must also notice the possible absence of jurisdiction
because we are obligated to do so even when the issue
is not raised by a party.  See, e.g., Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391,
398 (1979);  Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U. S.
737, 740 (1976).  And we may, pursuant to this Court's
Rule 24.1(a), -consider a plain error not among the
questions presented but evident from the record and
otherwise within [our] jurisdiction to decide.-  See, e.g.,
Wood v. Georgia, 450 U. S. 261, 265, n. 5 (1981); see
generally R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme
Court Practice  6.26 (6th ed. 1986) (discussing Rule
14.1(a) and its exceptions).
  The present case bears scant resemblance to those
cited above in which we have made exceptions to the
provisions of Rule 14.1.  While the decision on any
particular motion to intervene may be a difficult one, it
is always to some extent bound up in the facts of the
particular case.  Should we undertake to review the
Court of Appeals' decision on intervention, it is unlikely
that any new principle of law would be enunciated, as
is evident from the briefs of the parties on this question.
As we said in Yee, Rule 14.1(a) helps us -[t]o use our
resources most efficiently- by highlighting those cases
-that will enable us to resolve particularly important
questions.-  503 U. S., at ____.  The Court of Appeals'
disposition of petitioner's motion to intervene is simply
not such a question.
  Should we disregard the Rule here, there would also
be a natural tendency - to be consciously resisted, of
course - to reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals
on the intervention question in order that we could
address the merits of the question on which we actually
granted certiorari; otherwise, we would have devoted our
efforts solely to addressing a relatively factbound issue
which does not meet the standards that guide the
exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction.  Our faithful
application of Rule 14.1(a) thus helps ensure that we are
not tempted to engage in ill-considered decisions of
questions not presented in the petition.  Faithful
application will also inform those who seek review here
that we continue to strongly -disapprove the practice of
smuggling additional questions into a case after we
grant certiorari.-  Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128,
129 (1954) (plurality opinion).
  Izumi was not a party to the appeal below, and the
Court of Appeals denied its motion to intervene there.
Because we decline to review the propriety of the Court
of Appeals' denial of intervention, petitioner lacks
standing under 1254(1) to seek review of the question
presented in the petition for certiorari.  The writ of
certiorari is therefore dismissed as improvidently
granted.
                            It is so ordered.